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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS









On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 04-166)
(Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, Chief United States District Judge)
__________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 31, 2006
Before: SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges, and ACKERMAN, District Judge.*
(Filed: April 7, 2006 )
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
ACKERMAN, District Judge.  This matter comes before the Court on an appeal
from a criminal conviction and sentencing following Appellant Jerrad K. Allen’s guilty
2plea to all counts of a three-count indictment alleging (1) possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, (2) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime, and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Allen filed a pretrial motion
to suppress evidence of the drugs and firearm on Fourth Amendment grounds, and Chief
Judge Donetta W. Ambrose denied the motion.  The District Court sentenced Allen to a
term of imprisonment of 120 months on counts 1 and 3, to be served concurrently, and 60
months on count 2, to be served consecutively.  In his plea agreement, Allen preserved his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  The sole issue on appeal is whether
the District Court properly denied the motion to suppress.  This Court has appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We now affirm.  
I.
On August 6, 2003, City of Pittsburgh police officers were investigating an
individual named Anthony Swann for suspected narcotics offenses.  Working with a
confidential informant (“CI”), the officers arranged to conduct a drug buy/bust.  At the
appointed time, the CI called Swann and ordered nine ounces of cocaine.  The CI
informed the officers that Swann would likely arrive in a white Lincoln or a white Lexus,
but that he might also arrive in a jitney.  If Swann arrived with another male, the CI
warned, the officers should exercise caution because the second person could have a gun
in the vehicle.
The CI drove to the agreed-upon location, and the officers set up surveillance. 
Officers observed a burgundy Ford F150 truck, occupied by Allen and Swann, arrive and
3park next to the CI’s car.  Swann emerged from the passenger side of the truck and
entered the CI’s vehicle, leaving Allen behind the wheel of the idling truck.  Shortly
thereafter, the CI flashed the brake lights of his car, signaling to the officers that the CI
had observed the drugs.
Upon seeing the CI’s signal, officers approached the parked cars.  While other
officers approached Swann, Detective Provident of the Pittsburgh Police Department
approached the driver’s side of the truck where Allen remained seated.  Detective
Provident identified himself with his badge and ordered Allen out of the truck.  As Allen
emerged, Detective Provident patted around Allen’s waist and immediately discovered a
loaded handgun concealed in Allen’s waistline. 
While keeping his hand on Allen’s handgun, Detective Provident ordered Allen to
lie on the ground.  Once Allen was on the ground, Detective Provident asked Allen
whether he had a permit for the firearm, and Allen responded that he did not.  At that
point, Detective Provident removed the handgun and placed Allen under arrest.  An
incidental search revealed that Allen also was carrying a quantity of crack cocaine and
$2,860 in his left pocket.
II.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the
underlying factual findings for clear error, and we exercise plenary review over the
district court’s application of the law to those facts.  United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d
207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
4The District Court found, based on the facts described, that Detective Provident
performed a valid investigatory stop and search of Allen pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).  A Terry stop is justified when an officer has reasonable suspicion, based
on specific and articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts, that criminal
activity may be afoot.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Terry, 392 U.S. at
21.  In such circumstances, the officer may conduct a limited search of the outer clothing
of the person or persons with whom he is dealing for the presence of weapons.  Terry,
392 U.S. at 30.  Any weapons found in the course of such a search are generally
admissible as evidence against the person from whom they were taken.  Id. at 31. 
A court will measure the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion by what the
officer knew before conducting the search.  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000). 
When making this inquiry, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances
confronting the officer at the time of the stop-and-frisk.  United States v. Bonner, 363
F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004).  The officer’s experience and knowledge should figure
prominently into the court’s analysis.  United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.
2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has “accorded great deference to the officer’s
knowledge of the nature and the nuances of the type of criminal activity that he had
observed in his experience, almost to the point of permitting it to be the focal point of the
analysis”).
At the time he performed the search of Allen, Detective Provident had 17 years of
experience with the Pittsburgh Police Department, 16 of which were as a narcotics
5detective.  He testified at the suppression hearing that firearms are often involved in
narcotics offenses.  For this reason, he testified, narcotics detectives routinely “secure”
the scene of an arrest by checking individuals at the scene for weapons.  Here, the officers
knew from the CI that if a second person accompanied Swann to the scene, that person
probably would have a firearm.  Indeed, Officer Provident testified that the CI told
officers “that if there was a second person, they would definitely be part of the drug
transaction.  If they were having a firearm or carrying it, they are there to protect the
person they are with.”  (App. Vol. 2 at 58.)  Therefore, it is clear that when the officers
observed Allen accompanying Swann to the scene of the buy/bust, and later saw the CI’s
signal indicating that Swann had brought the narcotics, they had reasonable suspicion to
justify a Terry search of Allen.  
We perceive no legal significance in the CI indicating to officers that Swann might
arrive at the scene in a white Lincoln or Lexus, when in fact he arrived in a burgundy
Ford truck.  The CI also told officers that Swann might arrive in a jitney, and at the
suppression hearing Officer Provident testified to his understanding that a jitney could be
any vehicle.  (App. Vol. 2 at 55-56.)  Therefore, the fact that Allen arrived in a burgundy
Ford truck is not inconsistent with the CI’s information and need not have dispelled the
officers’ reasonable suspicion.
Allen cites Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990), for the proposition that
officers acting on information provided by an informant may not conduct a Terry stop
absent indicia of reliability.  In White, the Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip,
6corroborated by independent detective work, may provide sufficient indicia of reliability
to justify a Terry stop.  Id. at 326-27.  If White helped to define the boundary between a
mere hunch and reasonable suspicion, the instant case surely falls well on the side of the
latter.  Here, police were not reacting to an anonymous tip.  They were working with a
live informant who police understood had conducted previous deals with Swann. 
Officers were present when the CI phoned Swann to arrange the sale.  When Swann
appeared at the appointed time and location, and the CI signaled to officers that Swann
had brought the drugs, the CI’s information was corroborated.  Therefore, we think that
the totality of the circumstances, viewed in light of the officers’ specialized experience,
easily corroborated the CI’s information and justified Detective Provident’s reasonable
suspicion.    
III.
We find that Detective Provident possessed reasonable suspicion based on specific
and articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, and executed a near-textbook
Terry stop-and-frisk before placing Allen under arrest.  We will therefore AFFIRM the
District Court’s Order denying Allen’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and
crack cocaine. 
